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Abstract 
 
In the opening months of 2011 thousands of migrants arrived on the small Italian island of 
Lampedusa. In their responses, national governments in Europe appeared to self-interestedly 
close their national borders, rather than establish a common protection of the Mediterranean 
border to ‘Fortress Europe’. Different border controls appeared in Lampedusa, the Italian 
peninsula and the Franco-Italian border. This paper examines this case and asks why controls 
arose in different times and places in Southern Europe. The border is conceptualised as a 
process of differentiation tied to politically contingent decision making processes in which 
Italian, French and European actors attempted to define the nature of the flows and the 
responses to take within the structural framework of the EU’s border regime. The analysis 
illustrates the political dynamics by which migration through Europe’s Southern border can 
be regulated and controlled in contextually contingent locations. 
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Introduction 
 
Over past decades, European Union (EU) leaders have been moving closer to the 
establishment of a common border regime. Particularly to the south, this is associated with 
defining the limits of, and restricting access to, what has commonly been called ‘Fortress 
Europe’ (Geddes 2008a, Talani 2009). However, during the opening months of 2011 the 
fortress logic was challenged following the arrival of thousands of migrants from North 
Africa on the Italian island of Lampedusa. The first arrivals were kept in a temporary camp 
on the island and subsequently split between others on the Italian mainland before being 
granted temporary visas to remain on humanitarian grounds. Later arrivals were, however, 
given deportation orders. Meanwhile, the Italian government’s response was closely observed 
across Europe by other Member State governments. These reacted in a protectionist and 
security-based manner; the Dutch Minister for Immigration and Asylum declared himself 
‘quite dissatisfied with Italy's surprise decision to pass on its problems’ and the German 
Interior Minister categorically stated that ‘Italy must solve its refugee problem itself’ 
(Euractiv 12 April 2011). Perhaps the most dramatic response was the French decision to 
reinstate identity checks on ‘North Africans’ at the frontier with Italy (Carrera et al. 2011).  
In response to this arrival of migrants across the Mediterranean, border controls 
appeared to be contentious and changing. Migrants’ statuses were defined in ambiguous ways 
whilst the reactions from Member States endangered the ‘spirit of the Schengen agreements’, 
according to Herman van Rompuy of the European Council (Ibid.). The present paper 
examines this situation, asking why border controls appeared in some times and places, and 
not others. In doing so, the migration crisis of spring 2011 is employed as a lens through 
which to comprehend the complex nature of border management in the EU's multi-level 
polity, revealing the tensions which exist at the junction of state sovereignty, the integration 
of the EU and international migration in Southern Europe. Traditional conceptualisations of 
borders as fixed and clear territorial limits to sovereign states have led to immigration being 
seen as part of globalisation’s challenge to the territorial integrity of nation states (Joppke 
1998, Sassen 1996). However, this paper is concerned with how the development of the EU’s 
multi-level and multi-location border regime actually provides opportunities for Member 
States to restate their control over their polity and territory. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The first section conceptualises borders as a 
process of differentiation of the status of included and excluded individuals through multi-
level policies and multi-location controls. The way that these controls arise in practice will be 
examined through an analysis of the decision making process. The second section outlines the 
legal and institutional structures that constitute the regulatory and policy tools for the 
governance of the borders of the EU. The third section reviews the responses to the arrival of 
North African migrants on the island of Lampedusa during the spring of 2011. It illustrates 
the different ways that the European Commission and Italian and French governments 
attempted to define the nature of the migration flows and, consequently, the adequate 
response to take. These arguments also presented diverse interpretations of the EU’s border 
control framework, which were instrumental in justifying the decisions on which migrants 
could or could not enter Europe. The final section puts forward some conclusions regarding 
the implications of these events for our understanding of the contextual nature of the EU’s 
borders. 
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Conceptualising and Analysing Borders 
 
A significant body of theory and empirical analysis has been written on the way that the 
current phase of globalisation, characterised by a blurring of boundaries between local, 
national and international levels of politics, economics and social relations, challenges many 
of the established ways of interpreting and understanding the state and society (see for 
example, Beck 2005, Castells 2000, Sassen 1996, 2008, Talani 2004, 2009, Walker 1993, 
2010). Within this wider academic field, a growing literature has taken as its central concern 
the relationship between borders, security and state sovereignty (see for example Bigo 2005, 
Brunet-Jailly 2011, Elden 2009, Mau et al 2012, Parker 2009, Parker & Vaughan-Williams 
2009, Rigo 2005, Rumford 2006, 2009, Vaughan-Williams 2008, 2009). This work confronts 
and questions the commonly-held assumption that borders constitute fixed dividing lines 
marking the reach of sovereign state authority over a defined territory and population, 
enabling people and institutions to be categorised as internal or external to the state according 
to their geographical position (Joppke 1998: 10, Vaughan Williams 2008: 324).  
Two central insights of this field are of particular interest to this study because they 
outline the shifting structural framework of border controls. Firstly, the border should be 
reinterpreted as a site of exchange and differentiation, rather than a dividing barrier between 
inside and outside. An inside only has meaning if related to a definable, constitutive outside: 
that which is defined as internal is necessarily viewed in relation to something else which is 
known, but excluded as different (Vaughan Williams 2008, 2009). Also, exclusion can occur 
within countries, such as in camps where persecuted people remain physically present on a 
state’s geographical space, but are excluded from everyday life (Ibid.). Sovereign power is 
not therefore understood as bounded by a state’s physical space, but by its authority to 
construct patterns of inclusion and exclusion through deciding the status of individuals 
(Vaughan Williams 2009: 744). Secondly, border controls constitute part of a system that can 
be spatially defined in diverse ways rather than being territorially fixed and permanent. 
However, this does not imply that their material dimension should be ignored: borders may 
have been reconfigured but controls and practices of differentiation do occur in certain places 
and at specific times (Elden 2009). Border controls, fences, walls, lines on maps, observation 
posts, and even houses, walls and doors, as well as the press and mass communication about 
these, construct and dramatise borders as markers of physical space (Huysmans 2000, 
Robertson 2008, Monzini 2007). As noted by studies of ‘borderlands’, borders can and do 
have territorial dimensions that are linked to social and cultural constructions of inclusion and 
exclusion (for example, Diener and Hagen 2010, Konrad and Nicol 2011). Yet controls such 
as those for the regulation of immigration are constructed and maintained via a range of 
functions throughout societies involving the recognition of identity documents, granting or 
denial of rights to residence or employment, and so on. This engages diverse actors from 
immigration ministries to policemen, from local administrations to citizens and ‘ordinary 
people’ (Bigo 2005: 70, Rumford 2009: 2, see also Balibar 1998).  
Borders can therefore be understood as processes of differentiation of the statuses of 
individuals which can be practiced through controls built up in certain locations and times 
according to decisions made within specific political and social contexts. This applies clearly 
to the multi-level polity of the EU, where a complex system of regulations and measures 
involves a wide range of actors in immigration control, from the European Commission to 
national governments and local administrations, as well as non-state lobbies and NGOs. An 
understanding of the shape of the EU’s borders must therefore be able to disentangle the 
patterns of political interaction and decision making that produce them (Brunet-Jailly 2011: 
1). The objective of this paper is therefore to examine the political dimension of decision 
making within the structural framework of border management in Southern Europe and how 
this has influenced where controls arise and what form they take. 
The migration policy literature offers distinct views of this decision making process. 
On one hand, studies of securitisation have argued that restrictions to migrant entry have 
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arisen as part of an elite push for controlling population movements (Collyer 2006, Feldman 
2012, Huysmans 2000, 2006, Huysmans and Buonfino 2008). These claim that the discursive 
construction of threats by political and administration leaders is an essential part of justifying 
the expansion of state control of migration. But in doing so, they also underestimate the 
diversity of actors and objectives within the decision making process that may influence 
outputs and outcomes in ways not focused on restricting entry (Boswell and Geddes 2011: 42-
44). On the other hand, liberal realist academics have explained generally permissive entry 
policies as the product of the lobbying of economic interests or societal groups motivated by 
the same liberal values that governments are eager to emphasise (Freeman 1995, Geddes 
2008a, Hollifield 1992, 2000, 2004). This may occur even when political rhetoric expresses a 
wish to restrict immigration, because immigration policymaking is viewed as an essentially 
technical process of balancing interests that is largely removed from public debate (Boswell 
and Geddes 2011: 43-4, see also Boswell 2007, Geddes 2008b). Yet this cannot explain why 
actors consistently do put immigration on the political agenda as a cause of security threats 
and humanitarian emergencies. Furthermore, in the specific case studied here, neither the 
restrictive tendencies of securitisation nor the permissive drive of interest group mobilisation 
alone are able to explain the dual decision to allow entry permits to Italy for some North 
African migrants in early 2011 whilst simultaneously restricting that of others from the same 
point of origin. This can be summarised as the liberal paradox at the heart of migration 
politics: whilst economic forces open state borders, political and legal ones attempt to close 
them (Boswell and Geddes 2011, Geddes 2008a, Hollifield 1992, 2004, Joppke 1998, Sassen 
1996).  
The analytical approach of this paper follows that of recent research in attempting to 
overcome this dichotomy between restrictive security controls or open economic borders 
(Boswell 2007: 76, see also Boswell 2011, Boswell and Geddes 2011, Boswell et al 2011, 
Brunsson 1989, Geddes 2008a, Scholten 2011). According to this approach, states are not 
unitary actors in decision making but composed of and linked with diverse ministries, 
departments, interest groups, political parties, and so on. The objective of these diverse actors 
is to gain legitimacy by defining the social problem at stake and proposing its most 
appropriate solution. However, they represent, and gain legitimacy from, different audiences. 
Rival claims therefore offer diverse causes and solutions according to whether they are 
appealing to the press, public opinion, government ministries or organised interests. They also 
construct problems and responses in different ways because they must balance their own 
objectives with the perceived and real structural opportunities for action within the legal, 
institutional and organisational contexts. Discrepancies can therefore arise between 
definitions of the problem and the implementation of responses as actors interpret their 
structural settings in differing ways and adopt varying logics of action, with the result that 
policy measures do not necessarily match the content of the dominant discourse on the issue 
(Brunsson 1989, Boswell and Geddes 2011: 71-5, Geddes 2008b). 
Decision making is therefore a competitive process between structurally-situated, 
legitimacy-seeking actors. Understood in this way, the first step of the analysis is to clarify 
the legal and institutional context, examining the structural opportunities for responses to 
migratory flows. This is the subject of the following section. The second and third steps are 
presented together as the penultimate section of the paper. The second step will be to outline 
the responses to the migratory flows of 2011 in order to illustrate how different actors defined 
the issue but also interpreted their structural opportunities for action and suggested 
resolutions. The third step will assess the implementation of policy responses and their 
relation with the institutional context and issue definition, demonstrating how EU regulations 
on borders could be interpreted and implemented in varying ways according to different 
objectives. Consequently, rather than an undermining of the nation state by EU policy 
harmonisation and uncontrolled migratory flows from North Africa, in the spring of 2011 we 
find a reaffirmation of the idea of national borders as dividing lines between state territories 
and tension around who holds the power to decide on the status of arriving migrants in the 
EU. 
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The EU’s Common Border Policies 
 
The present section summarises the development of an EU migration policy field. National 
leaders have repeatedly criticised the weakness of Europe’s border controls and blamed a lack 
of controls between Member States for increases in illegal immigrants and organised crime in 
their countries (see for example, The Guardian, 16
th
 March 2012). The motivation for 
establishing common migration policies in the European Community was initially to restrict 
the access of third country nationals (Boswell 2003, Guiraudon 2000, Huysmans 2000, 
Lavenex 2006, Schierup et al. 2006). Yet as the migration policy field has grown it has 
adapted from this garrison or fortress function into a selective process of allowing some 
groups of migrants to enter whilst restricting the movement of others (Hollifield 2004). As 
described elsewhere, Europe has erected a tall wall with small doors in it (Geddes 2008a). 
The common governance of Europe’s borders has the Schengen system as its 
foundations (see also Boswell 2003, Lavenex 2006, Geddes 2001, 2008a). Although it was 
originally signed in 1985 between Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and 
Germany, the Schengen acquis was only incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, 
under title IV on visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of 
persons. The agreement was intended to facilitate freedom of movement between Member 
States whilst ‘enhancing’ their security (Official Journal L 239, 22/09/2000). It brought about 
the strengthening of security checks on non-EU citizens whilst differentiating between 
external (with non-EU states) and internal (between Member States) borders and controls. 
External borders and visa checks were harmonised (Schengen acquis chapter 2.2), and 
internal security controls were bolstered by the shared Schengen Information System (SIS) 
holding data on illegal or undesirable migrants (chapter 2.5), cooperation between police 
forces (chapter 2.3), cooperation between legal authorities (chapter 2.4), cooperation on 
countering drug trafficking (Com-ex (93) 14), and common rules on extradition (Com-ex (96) 
decl 6 rev 2). 
Since 2006 this has been further developed through the Schengen Borders Code 
(SBC) (Regulation (EC) 562/2006), which has outlined common rules applicable to checks at 
external border crossings. The SBC covers the conduct of national border authorities when 
carrying out checks, underlining the importance of human dignity and the principle of non-
discrimination (art. 6), as well as the common measures for refusal of entry to foreigners and 
their rights to appeal to such a decision (art. 13). It also states that third country nationals can 
be rejected entry if without a valid travel document, a valid visa, or ‘sufficient means of 
subsistence’ for their stay, as well as if they are included on the SIS database or perceived to 
be a ‘threat to public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of 
any of the Member States’ (art. 5.1). They may however be allowed entry ‘on humanitarian 
grounds, on the ground of national interest or because of international obligations’ (art 
5.4(c)). However, Member States are also given freedom for the ‘temporary reintroduction’ of 
border controls where there is ‘a serious threat to public policy or internal security’ but this 
should not amount to a systematic or discriminatory procedure (art. 23).  
At the heart of the Schengen agreements there is, nevertheless, tension between the 
principles of subsidiarity, meaning respect by other Member States for the decision on 
allowing or denying migrant entry at the country of arrival, and responsibility, implying that 
the country of arrival cannot take decisions that would be seen to endanger the public policy 
or internal security of other Member States. National governments are able to act 
independently, restricting entry and free movement at internal borders and revoking the 
permission given in other Member States when this is justified as a security issue or when 
immigrants do not have sufficient means for subsistence. These powers have been evoked 
repeatedly by a range of different Member States (Carrera et al. 2011). As will be noted 
below, however, ‘threat’ and sufficiency’ are ambiguous concepts that give space for 
disagreement. 
In addition to these legislative provisions, the EU’s border control measures have also 
been increasingly directed at operational activities through the Frontex agency and 
Simon McMahon  Europe’s contextual Mediterranean border 
4 
cooperation with sending and transit countries (European Council, Tampere SN 200/99, 15/16 
Oct 1999). Frontex was originally established in 2004 (Council Regulation 2007/2004) and its 
material resources are expanding, such as through the deployment of Rapid Border 
Intervention Teams (RABITs) of national border guards which can be sent to work in ‘crisis 
situations’ in other Member States. Frontex’s research and risk assessment reports are also 
important tools for ‘dramatising’ migration issues and ‘conveying images of Europe under 
threat’ (Boswell and Geddes 2011: 124). However, the agency does not ‘govern’ the borders 
of Europe. Rather, its key tasks are surveillance of the ‘external borders’ of Europe, risk 
assessment, research and training of border guards. This is achieved through coordinating 
national and EU systems and responding to Member State calls for support in emergencies to 
‘help border authorities work together’ (Frontex 2012). As will be illustrated below, the 
definition of migratory flows as an emergency can therefore be a route to economic and 
material resources. In this way, Frontex constitutes a network of connections between 
national and EU level material infrastructures and policy officials (Feldman 2012: 85).  
Finally, although originally mentioned in a Commission communication in 1994 
(Geddes 2008a: 177), the externalisation of migration controls has been an area in consistent 
expansion since the establishment of a High Level Working Group on the issue in 1998 
(Boswell 2003, Geddes 2008a). Its focus is strongly on border management and deterrence of 
immigration. This ‘external dimension’ of EU immigration and asylum policy has been 
summarised by Boswell as composed of two main elements (2003). Firstly, ‘externalisation’ 
has involved classical migration control instruments such as border controls, measures to 
prevent undocumented migration, smuggling and trafficking, capacity-building of asylum 
systems and migration management in transit countries being ‘exported’ to sending countries 
and future Member States as part of the accession process, as well as the return of asylum 
seekers and undocumented migrants being facilitated through readmission agreements 
(Boswell 2003: 622). Secondly, preventive approaches have been the central vision of the 
Global Approach to immigration and asylum, announced by the Council in 2005, and by 
which development aid, the European Neighbourhood Policy and foreign policy tools were 
brought into a framework of preventing cross-border movement of people by ‘tackling the 
root causes of migration’ (Council of the European Union 2005). Differentiation of migrants 
to be included or excluded therefore no longer occurs by checks at ‘external’ entry points to 
the geographical territories of EU Member States, but at various locations outside of Europe. 
This has resulted in controversial agreements with countries such as Libya with a suspect 
human rights record and questionable government practices (Hamood 2008, Paoletti 2011).  
The framework outlined here for governing the borders to the EU can thus be 
summarised as aiming to regulate the access of third country nationals through a combination 
of legislative and technical borders and controls. The multi-level nature of the EU means that 
competences are spread between the Commission, national governments and neighbouring 
third countries, as well as through the coordination of the Frontex agency. In this context, the 
Schengen agreement’s distinction between internal and external borders is misleading. By 
sharing information and functions between countries, as well as moving border measures to 
third countries, policymakers have diversified the localities of physical controls, which are in 
turn supported by common identity documents, visas, and the information available on shared 
security databases. As will be illustrated more clearly in the case study below, the decisions 
on the status of arriving individuals and the measures used to confront them are formally the 
responsibility of the Member State of entry, but in the EU framework the internal politics of 
national governments are tied to dynamics in other Member States as well as those at external 
sites of control.  
 
 
The North African Migration Crisis of 2011 
 
The North African migrations of spring 2011 illustrate clearly in practice how entry to Europe 
is not simply achieved by crossing the Italian coast or landing on the island of Lampedusa. 
Indeed, the idea of a common Southern European border was challenged when instability of 
Simon McMahon  Europe’s contextual Mediterranean border 
5 
the external dimension in Tunisia and Libya was accompanied by contention between 
national governments claiming the legitimacy of their decision on the status of arriving 
migrants. 
Beginning in December 2010, a wave of protests and movements for rights and 
democracy swept across many countries of North Africa and the Middle East. In January 
2011 the Tunisian president demitted, and in February of the same year the Egyptian 
president followed suit. February also saw people take to the streets in Libya, with the 
movement subsequently being repressed by the military, leading to an armed insurrection, a 
NATO intervention and ultimately military conflict. These developments have had an 
undeniable influence on migration flows to Europe.  
However, migration flows to Italy from the southern shores of the Mediterranean 
were at this point nothing new. Indeed, the Mediterranean has been defined as a ‘human unit’, 
a space of trade and population movement that has existed since the nineteenth century 
(Collyer 2006, King 2001). In addition, during the 1990s the migrant stock of the countries of 
North Africa was particularly high, due to a combination of demographics and employment 
dynamics resulting in a large number of young adults facing insufficient labour market 
opportunities in their origin societies (Fargues 2004). Although the total number of arrivals to 
Italy by sea has fluctuated over the past decade, during the 2000s there were consistent 
increases in the number of arrivals on Lampedusa. By 2006 nearly all of the arrivals to Italy’s 
coastline were to Sicily and Lampedusa, until 2010 when the route was physically blocked by 
policing from Italian, Libyan, and Tunisian land and sea patrols. The total number of 
intercepted migrant crossings fell over this period from 37,000 in 2008, to 9,600 in 2009 and 
under 3,000 in 2010 (OECD 2011). Similarly, Frontex’s recordings of irregular migration 
crossings through the Central Mediterranean peaked at over 16,000 in 2008 before lowering 
during 2009 and 2010 (Frontex 2011a). 
Political measures contributing to a decreasing of these migratory flows came as part 
of a wider series of bilateral treaties and conditionality agreements tied into the increasing 
political and economic cooperation between the EU and its southern Neighbourhood as well 
as the externalisation of migration controls (Paoletti 2011). The objective was clearly to 
restrict and control migration flows. The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 between the EU and 
countries in the Southern Mediterranean area proposed Euro-Mediterranean cooperation to 
reduce migratory pressures through vocational training and job creation and to fight against 
illegal immigration through readmittance procedures. Coming at a time of increasing 
migration from other parts of the African continent to the Maghreb, a proportion of which 
continues as transit migration to Europe, these countries have put themselves in the difficult 
situation of receiving migrants whilst also having to restrict the emigration of all individuals 
from their territory (Fargues 2004, Di Bartolomeo et al. 2010).  
Tunisia was the first Maghreb country to ratify its association agreement with the EU, 
and its legal reform of 2004 implemented the Palermo Protocol against smuggling by defining 
sanctions against any contribution to irregular migration (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2010). A 
readmission agreement for undocumented migrants was also signed with the EU in 2009 
(Frontex 2011b). With Libya, the Italian government had already signed a series of bilateral 
agreements on fighting terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration (2000), the 
readmission of undocumented migrants and sea crossings (2003), and common sea patrols 
(2007) (Hamood 2008, Di Bartolomeo et al. 2011). In 2008 the Italian government also 
signed a Partnership Treaty including a sharing of border patrols and a readmission agreement 
as part of a five billion euro settlement of colonial memory, including the delivery in 2009 of 
ships to the Libyan government by the Italian Guardia di Finanza, at which the Italian 
Minister for the Interior stated that ‘the fight against illegal immigration and organised crime 
that manages human trafficking is the primary objective for Italy and Libya’ (Ministero 
dell’Interno 10th February 2010). Subsequent agreements with the EU have included funding 
to Libya for restricting access to migrants from Niger along the primary land-based migration 
route from sub-Saharan Africa to Benghazi, Tripoli and then Italy (Di Bartolomeo et al. 
2011). This was followed in 2010 by a Memorandum of Understanding and a Migration 
Cooperation Agenda between the EU and Libya which offered an investment of 60 million 
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euros for the period of 2011-2013 to improve public services in Libya, as well as capacity 
building of maritime search and rescue, readmittance procedures, and measures to restrict 
irregular migration with Niger to the South and the EU to the North (European Commission 
2010). In Libya the official explanation of the use of restrictive immigration policies 
involving detainment and deportation has emphasised the influence of European pressure 
(Paoletti 2011: 222-3). As is clear, the objective was to restrict migration flows and such 
measures were apparently successful with recorded irregular departures from Libya’s 
coastline almost entirely stopping in 2010 (Frontex 2011b).  
During the opening months of 2011, unrest and political change in these countries 
posed a challenge to this migration management. On the one hand, the removal of the 
Tunisian government caused a void in upholding security and readmission agreements, whilst 
patrols of the Tunisian coastal border stopped. On the other hand, negotiations with Libya on 
the Cooperation agenda were suspended from the 22
nd
 of February, following the outbreak of 
military conflict (EEAS 2011). As a result of the political and military contexts, the Southern 
Mediterranean border control broke down. As can be seen in figure 2, this was reflected in the 
number of migrants from North Africa rising again from the end of 2010 onwards, and 
particularly by 20,000 migrants from Tunisia arriving in the 1
st
 quarter of 2011. In January 
2011 some 5,000 Tunisians arrived on Lampedusa (according to UNHCR). This was 
accompanied by over 13,000 Libyan migrants from February to May (Di Bartolomeo et al. 
2011). By April 2011 there had been 390 crossings bringing 25,867 migrants to Italy 
(Ministero dell’Interno 29th March 2011), and in May it was announced that 28,000 migrants 
had arrived on Italian shores, amid claims that there were 300,000 (according to the Italian 
government) or up to 700,000 (according to the EU) still to come. Subsequently, Colonel 
Gaddafi threatened to send hundreds of martyrs to Europe (The Guardian, 8 July 2011) and 
warned of the consequences of uncontrolled emigration from his country’s shores 
destabilising Italy’s government (Corriere della Sera, 15 March 2011). This constituted the 
continuation of a Libyan trend of employing the expulsion of large numbers of its significant 
migrant stock as a foreign policy lever in international relations (Paoletti 2011).  
Without controls in North Africa, attention was cast on Lampedusa. The political 
responses to the arrival of the migrants were contentious. At the EU level, the Commission 
issued a series of responses which underlined the situation of emergency being faced in 
Lampedusa, as well as the countries of origin in North Africa, and concentrated on ways of 
resolving the humanitarian necessity of the migrants and sharing the burden between Member 
States. The Commission’s proposed resolutions emphasised the availability of formal 
structures and established regulations, reflecting its character as a largely technocratic actor 
which does not have to mobilise or conform to public opinion’s expectations of behaviour. In 
three memos published in February (MEMO/11/98), March (MEMO/11/179), and April 
(MEMO/11/226), the range of legal and practical tools available to Member States was made 
clear. These included: financial support through a Return Fund, Integration Fund, External 
Borders Fund, and Refugee Fund, with the latter two making available up to 25 million euros 
of emergency funding; practical technical support in the form of agents for interviewing 
migrants, Europol agents to detect possible human trafficking, aerial and naval surveillance 
and possible asylum support teams to contribute to processing refugee claims; and finally, 
‘comprehensive EU assistance’ for the promotion of political, economic and social stability in 
Tunisia and Libya, as well as readmission agreements and procedures with these countries in 
order to reduce emigration flows. Each of these memos constituted a call to coordinate the 
management of migratory flows through pre-existing policy measures and repeatedly 
affirmed the ‘solidarity’ between Member States and North African countries. In this way, the 
Commission argued that the migratory pressures of spring 2011 were to be confronted 
through the normal crisis resolution measures of the EU, and in accordance with the key 
principles of EU law. This would have given EU border, asylum and police agents the power 
to decide the status of and responses to migrants arriving on Lampedusa.  
However, the Italian government appeared more concerned with the possible social 
impact of the arrivals. The migrants were framed as an invasion that the government could 
only resolve through ad hoc security measures, presenting Lampedusa as a borderland where 
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the country’s limits were being breached. This continued a trend already seen in Italy since 
the 1990s, particularly from parties of the centre-right, of publicly defining immigration as a 
threat to public order (e.g. Barbagli 2008, Geddes 2008b, McMahon 2012, Sciortino and 
Colombo 2004). Restrictions to entry had therefore already been publicly projected as a 
legitimate response to immigration. The exceptionality of the circumstances of 2011 was 
articulated in February when the Minister for the Interior, Roberto Maroni, declared a 
humanitarian emergency whilst warning of the impending internal security threat to Europe 
and pleading for a ‘Marshall Plan’ to support the Italian response (La Stampa, 11 February 
2011). Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi subsequently promised to have the island empty of 
migrants within 48 hours, before nominating it for the Nobel Peace Prize and buying a house 
there (EU Observer, 31
st
 March 2011). At the same time, he likened the migrants from 
Tunisia and Libya to a threatening human tsunami (Corriere della Sera, 9 April 2011). Unlike 
the European Commission's comments, the Italian Ministry of the Interior argued that the 
normal migration and humanitarian policies of the EU and the Italian government would be 
unable to resolve the crisis; 
 
It is unthinkable that we confront the emergency coming from Tunisia with this indifference 
from Europe and the militant disarticulation of the rules on clandestine immigration carried 
out by a great part of the [Italian] magistrates. On one hand, due to our geographical position, 
we receive all [of the migrants], and on the other our deportations are blocked. (Sub-secretary 
Mantovano, Ministero dell’Interno 14th February 2011) 
 
The key points here are the definition of the situation as an emergency of great, exceptional 
scale, and the inability of normal EU law and policy or the current Italian national approach 
to contribute to its resolution. Ad hoc measures were viewed as necessary due to the 
ineffectiveness of normal EU and national crisis resolution measures. 
Through declaring an emergency Italian leaders looked to justify exceptional 
responses on humanitarian and security grounds. The definition of an emergency facilitated 
an appeal for economic and practical support from the EU, following the successfully granted 
RABIT from Frontex to the patrol of the Greek border with Turkey in 2010 (Carrera and 
Guild 2010). The result for the Italian government was the Frontex ‘Joint Operation Hermes’ 
beginning in late February. It also justified the prohibiting of movement of the migrants 
around or off the island, which caused the need for them to build makeshift tents on the hill 
surrounding the port of Lampedusa. In March, workers of the Italian Red Cross commented 
that more than 2,000 individuals were sleeping outdoors and without shelter (International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 28
th
 March 2011), whereas Amnesty 
International estimated the total to be 4,000 people (Amnesty International, 31
st
 March 2011). 
According to Medecins sans Frontieres, each migrant was permitted 1.5 litres of water per 
day and every chemical toilet available was shared by 187 people, contrasting recommended 
standards of 20 litres of water per person and only 20 people per chemical toilet (Reliefweb, 
1
st
 April 2011). The Italian interior ministry emphasised the importance of arranging 
deportations to lighten the humanitarian crisis in the island camp; relocating the migrants 
from the island to more permanent locations would not be necessary if they were to be 
deported to the point of origin, but without readmission agreements in Tunisia or Libya, these 
deportations could not legally be organised. The migrants were in a temporary limbo, unable 
to leave the island until the Italian government decided on the next steps to take.  
These next steps came on the 30th of March, when the government arranged for the 
migrants to be removed to camps, or tendopoli, around the Italian mainland (Ministero 
dell'Interno, 29th March 2011). The tendopoli were provided by the military and repeated 
previous attempts of emergency controls placing minorities away from politicians, press, 
judges and the general public (Sigona 2005). In terms of territory, the migrants had entered 
Italy but in terms of legal status they remained excluded from Italian state and society, and 
therefore from the EU. The makeshift camp on Lampedusa and the tendopoli around the 
peninsula are thus clear examples of an inclusive-exclusion facilitated by the public definition 
of the circumstances as an emergency (Vaughan-Williams 2008, 2009). 
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On 5
th
 April the Italian and Tunisian governments came to an agreement over 
repatriation, which would, according to Mr Maroni, enable them to ‘close the taps’ of 
migration flows (Corriere della Sera, 5
th
 April 2011). Migrants arriving after this date would 
be directly returned, finding the territorial and organisational borders of the Italian state 
closed before them at sea or the first land point of arrival. At the same time, the Italian 
government decided to grant temporary humanitarian visas and travel documents to the 
migrants who had arrived before the 5
th
 of April, in agreement with article 20 of the Italian 
Single Text on Immigration (Law 286/1998) and article 5.4 of the SBC, although both law 
286/1998 and the SBC are vague in the stating of the conditions and validity of these 
temporary protection visas. The intention was to allow Tunisians freedom of movement to 
relocate to other countries, coined ‘flushing the tank’ by the leader of the Northern League, 
Umberto Bossi (Corriere della Sera, 5
th
 April 2011). Thus for those arriving before the 5
th
 of 
April a humanitarian status was granted, whilst for other migrants of the same nationality 
from the same point of origin, but a different date of arrival, there effectively existed a 
separate, geographically and legally distinct border regime. These two choices of forced 
repatriation and humanitarian entry were nevertheless fuelled by the same objective of 
ensuring that the migrants did not remain in Italy, as the vivid rhetoric continued to show.  
Unfortunately for migrants holding the temporary visa, the borders of the EU were, 
moreover, no longer to prove conterminous with the borders of Italy. Rather than accepting 
the validity of the humanitarian visa, other Member States accused Italian leaders of 
irresponsibly shifting the burden of the migrants onto them. A rejection of the visa's validity 
was justified by defining the migrants' presence as a threat on economic and public order 
grounds, and facilitated by the ambiguous terms of the Schengen Borders Code regarding 
‘sufficient’ resources. The German Interior Minister stated that ‘Italy must solve its refugee 
problem itself’, and the Austrian Interior Minister declared that they would ‘look into what 
extent we will recognise visas issued by Italians, especially whether we allow in people who 
cannot feed for themselves. This would be a feeding ground for crime that I cannot allow’ 
(Euractiv 12 April 2011). The most visible response was that of the French government, 
which contested the legality of the temporary visa and reinstated border checks along the 
geographical frontier with Italy, rejecting migrants with insufficient financial resources and 
blocking a train across the border due to ‘public order concerns’ (Carrera et al. 2011). On the 
French side, free movement was restricted by physical controls. On the Italian side, migrants 
and protesters gathered at the town of Ventimiglia, uncertain of whether the right to free 
movement would be upheld.  
As in Italy, the centre-right French government of Nicolas Sarkozy had already over 
previous years adopted a control-based approach to restricting and rejecting immigration 
(Marthaler 2008). Furthermore, during the period preceding the Lampedusa crisis the 
conservative and explicitly anti-immigrant National Front had gained in popularity and 
moved ahead of Sarkozy’s governing Union for a People’s Movement in opinion polls (Le 
Parisien 8th March 2011). In reply the government expelled 25,500 irregular migrants in the 
first three months of 2011 and passed a new immigration law in April granting greater 
deportation powers (Carrera et al. 2011). Indeed, in 2011 the French government was reported 
to have set a new record for the quantity of annual deportations (Le Figaro, 27
th
 July 2011). 
This stance remained in confrontation with the North Africans: whilst the Italian humanitarian 
visa allowed for temporary residence in Italy, it was not accepted as granting an automatic 
right to free movement in France, due to the initial entry of these migrants not meeting the 
conditions of ‘sufficient resources’ in article 6 of the SBC. In this moment, the build up of 
political rhetoric and security actions ensured that an ‘internal’ EU border had become a 
physical, national barrier to movement between Italy and France.  
The legality of these responses has been concisely assessed by Carrera et al. (2011), 
who argue that both the Italian and the French governments acted within the terms of 
European law, because the SBC allows for the granting of a temporary visa but also allows 
for the reinstatement of internal borders. These authors also conclude, however, that the 
principles of the law were questioned, particularly the principles of subsidiarity (the need to 
respect the decision of the Member State constituting the point of arrival of migrants) and 
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responsibility (not allowing entry of migrants which may cause tensions in other Member 
States). In this sense, as the Italian government flaunted its responsibility to shoulder the 
burden of migration flows so too did the French government reject the decisions made by the 
country of arrival.  
As illustrated here, however, in doing so both countries evoked their authority to 
decide on the status of arriving migrants. This was facilitated by already existing discourses 
on the ‘threat’ of immigration, as well as the ambiguous terms of the EU's border legislation 
which could be interpreted and implemented in diverse ways. The definition of an emergency 
caused by the breaching of the border by North Africans was therefore emblematic of the way 
in which the declaring of a challenge to a country’s territorial integrity by migration can serve 
to justify increasing restrictions on the flows of people and the positioning of physical border 
controls. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper set out to examine way that common migration controls were apparently replaced 
by national measures in response to North African migrant arrivals in early 2011. A 
traditional interpretation of borders as dividing lines between internal and external spaces and 
as markers of the fixed, territorial limits of sovereign states was replaced by a theoretical 
framework which conceptualised the border as a process of differentiation between the 
statuses of flows of people. This called for an analytical focus on the border as a series of 
controls, the spatial dimension of which is contingent on political decisions. Sovereign power 
rests herein on the ability to decide, through normal legislative means or ad hoc measures, on 
these people’s status. From this framework the questioned was posed of why border controls 
do appear in some specific places and times. 
Examination of the EU’s border regime in the context of a declared emergency has 
highlighted space for discretion in the choices of national governments. In the case of arrivals 
from North Africa in 2011, with the disappearance of external immigration controls in 
Tunisia and Libya a range of distinct ‘internal’ control locations became relevant. The 
southern borders of the EU were thus located in varying places, depending on the 
opportunities for the EU Commission or the Member States to decide on the practical 
responses. In the EU, the decision on the entry or exclusion of migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean is initially made by the country of arrival, although this is conditioned by the 
interests and concerns of neighbouring Member States. With the declaration of a situation of 
crisis in spring 2011, however, the European Commission, Italian government and French 
government sought to define the issue in different ways. At the same time, the inability to 
deport migrants to their unstable countries of origin was replaced by their inclusive-exclusion 
in camps or the town of Ventimiglia, at the geographical limits of French territory. In this 
way, the political unrest and change in North Africa caused a temporary reorganisation of the 
places and methods of controls. 
The case study of migrations from North Africa to Italy in early 2011 therefore offers 
insights into the shape and functioning of the southern borders of the EU. As noted in the 
introduction, the border cannot simply be defined as a fixed line between inside and outside 
spaces and populations. In this way, physical controls are spread geographically from 
Ventimiglia to Lampedusa and beyond into the African continent, whilst being linked 
functionally through the granting or denial of identity documents, visas and entrance permits. 
The Italian government’s decision to grant humanitarian visas to some of the migrants and not 
others was emblematic of this and illustrated clearly how different mobility regimes could 
operate at the same time, allowing and denying entry to selected categories of people. The 
function of these controls was thus not to draw the territorial limits of states, but rather to 
define the status of arriving populations, showing the border’s character to be one of a semi-
permeable filter, rather than a solid wall around a fortress (Mau et al 2012). 
In this context, borders must be understood as a relation of interdependence. Controls 
are not simply everywhere but found in specific locations according to the social and political 
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contexts in which decisions about them are made. The stability of the Schengen regime and 
external dimension of controls is built on consensual definitions of which migrants may or 
may not pass the filter. However, this consensus disappeared in the case study shown here 
because the multi-level and multi-spatial framework provided an opportunity structure for 
Member State governments to choose how to respond to immigration. The Italian decision to 
grant humanitarian visas that would permit the migrants to leave and the French decision to 
define a threat to public order from their arrival and re-establish border checks are examples 
of this continued discretion around the definition of the status of arriving immigrants and 
illustrate how rather the power to decide on entry has not been entirely taken away from 
Member States. 
The capacity of border controls to be established in different times and places must 
therefore be viewed in light of the motivations and logics of decision makers in relation to the 
structural opportunities for discretionary action in this framework of interdependence. For 
representatives of the governing party in Italy, putting some immigrants in camps, returning 
others to Tunisia and speaking of those with humanitarian visas leaving for other Member 
States followed the same logic of aiming to restrict the presence of immigrants that had 
characterised public debate since the 1990s. Restricting access and allowing less immigrants 
into the country was presented as a legitimate choice whilst defining the situation as a crisis 
which could only be resolved by ad hoc measures delegitimised any alternative suggestions, 
such as those from the European Commission. In the responses of other Member States, a 
similar balancing act between public opinion and competing definitions of the problem and its 
resolution were also visible. In this way, the shape and function of border controls is therefore 
revealed as being tied to the intentions of inter-related actors whose motivations are not 
simply to limit access and control mobility, but rather to respond to and claim legitimacy 
from specific audiences. 
In conclusion, it is misleading to suppose that migration to Southern Europe, and in 
particular that of the thousands of North Africans who arrived on the island of Lampedusa in 
2011, has presented a challenge to the borders of the EU and its Member States. Academics 
have suggested that global flows of people contribute to the deterritorialisation of the state 
(Sassen 1996) whilst politicians have repeatedly claimed that they face an invasion or tsunami 
threatening their country’s social stability and territorial integrity. However, the analysis 
presented here suggests that this is not necessarily the case, and that in situations of change 
and crisis the contextual reorganisation of controls against immigration can constitute an 
affirmation of the presence of the border in new locations. 
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Tables 
 
 
Figure 1 
Migratory Arrivals On The Italian Coast, 2002-2010 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Sicily & 
Lampedusa 18,225 14,017 13,594 22,824 21,400 16,585 34,540 - - 
Only Lampedusa 9,669 8,819 10,497 14,855 18,096 - - 20,655 403 
Total Italy 23,719 14,331 13,635 22,939 22,016 20,165 36,951 29,076 3,499 
 
Source: Ministero dell’Interno 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Detections of irregular crossings at the sea border 2009-2011 
 
Country 2009 (4
th
 Quarter) 2010 (1
st
 Quarter) 2010 (2
nd
 Quarter) 2010 (3
rd
 Quarter) 2010 (4
th
 Quarter) 2011 (1
st
 Quarter) 
Algeria 1263 253 395 768  386   230 
Egypt 110 116 33 272  292   321 
Morocco 229 66 88 273  213   230 
Tunisia 115 34 191 416  70   20,258 
 
Source: Frontex 2011b 
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